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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
nic~AUGHTON and
~IcNAUGHTON, his wife,

JoHN E.

HENRIETTA

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.
JOHN B. EATON, an unmarried man;
MYRTLE Ross; JAMES H. FISHER and
CuNA FISHER, husband and wife;
RICE CooPER and EDITH R. LAwRENCE CooPER, husband and wife;
LEE MURRAY and THEDA MuRRAY,
husband and wife; W. S. Ross; and
FERN Ross FAwcETT,

Case No. 7646

Defendants and .Apcp-ellants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an action brought by plaintiffs, John E.
MeN a ugh ton and Henrietta E. MeN aughton, his wife,
against the ~defendants to quiet title in plaintiffs to the
water of a gulch commonly known as McN'aughton Gulch
running in a Southeasterly direction across plaintiffs'
property situated in Uintah County, State of Utah.
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Plaintiffs base their claim on prior appropriation of
the waters of McNaughton· Gulch flowing above and to
an alleged permanent dam located midway in plaintiffs'
property on the West line of the Northeast quarter of
the Southwest quarter of Section 21, Township 4 South,
Range 21 East, Salt Lake Meridian. (R. 26)
1

To the Amended Complaint the defendants filed an
Answer in which they denied generally the allegations
of the Complaint and asserted that they were the owners
of all waters flowing in the McNaughton Gulch, the same
having been adjudicated to them and their predecessors
in interest in 1920 in an action wherein Thomas Mantle
et al were plaintiffs and John B. Eaton et al were defendants, Civil Case No. 960, Uintah County, Utah,
which rights were prior and superior to any right claimed
by the plaintiffs and that defendants further cl aim said
waters by virtue of prior appropriation. (R. 38-39)
1

1

There were no further pleadings filed and upon the
issues thus raised a trial was had to the court, sitting
without a jury, and on the 9th day of .September, 1950,
the trial court made and entered its Memorandum Decision (R. 48-65) and upon the 26th day of October, 1950,
signed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Decree, and the same were filed ·October· 30, 1950. (R.
66-73)
By its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Decree, the trial court found against defendants
and ~awarded the water in controversy to the plaintiffs.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In its Memorandum Decision, the. court .he~d that both
parties to this cause had taken the· position that· the
waters_ in question "'"ere public "'"aters .and sul;>:ject to
appropriation, each claiming "the right to their use by
diYersion and application to beneficial use during .the
period "~hen such processes were all that were required to
effect lawful appropriation.'' (R.. 50.)
After making· this observatio~,. ho~ever, .the court
determined the case on the th,eory that th~. waters were
not public waters but were diffused, seepage and percolating '\Yaters not subject to a.ppropri~tion. (R.. 50, 54,
65)
'

The defen·dants then filed a motion for a new trial
upon the grounds that both plaintiffs and defend~~ts had
prosecuted the case _on the, theory that the· waters involved were public waters subject to a'ppropriation and
for that, reason defendants did not submit evidence. on
that :point and requested· permission to pres~nt evidence
showing such waters to be pub~ic water~ and ~n the
further ground that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Decree we're not supported by the evidence.
(R. 75) ·This motion was denied by the Court. (R. 82)
.

.

The defendants jointly and severally p-rosecute this
appeal froni the Decree entered against them ·on both
questions of law and of fact. (R. 83)
The following statements of fact are established
without conflict in the evidence:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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4
The plaintiffs own land referred to in the record
as the ''East 40'' and the ''West 40'' and which is
particularly described in their Amended Complaint.
There is a wash or gulch, know as MeN aughton Gulch,
which heads at a considerable distance Northwest from
plaintiffs' land and which crosses plaintiffs' property
running in a Southeasterly direction as shown on Def.
Exh. No. 1 and Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, extending beyond
plaintiffs' lands into and across and beyond lands of
some of the defendants. Where the gulch ends does not
appear from the record. It has existed from time immemorial with well defined course, hank and stream bed.
The trial court so found in its Memorandum Decision.
(R. 48)
In 1885 there was constructed an irrigation -canal
known as the Ashley Upper Canal which crossed the McNaughton Gulch approximately a mile Northwest of
plain tiffs' p-roperty. Beginning in 1886 the .portion of
the gulch just below the canal was and still is used as a
lateral of the Upper Canal system for a considerable
distance down to the Carroll dam at which point all
water in the gulch is diverted into what is referred to in
the record as the Middle Ditch. (R. 48)
The defendants divert water from the gulch in a
series of three dams, the upper one being located on the
plaintiffs' property just inside the East boundary and
the other two being situated below and to the East of
plaintiffs' property. See defendants' Exhibit 1.
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This controversy arose over the waters arising from
springs along the bank and bottom of the gulch and flowing do,Yn the gulch, 'Yhich flow steadily increases froin
approximately 1 C.F.S. in the distance of one mile from
just inside the '':est boundary of the plaintiffs' land to
from 3 to 7 C.F.S. (Tr. 64 and 126) flowing into the
.Llshley Central Canal "There this canal crosses the gulch
just below. the diYersion points of the defendants. This
flow is constant and year round and varies only as do
other creeks and streams in response to wet or dry season. ( Tr. 22, 66, 67, 126). There is no evidence of surface 'Yaste waters running into the gulch. The bottom
and sides of the gulch are covered with water cress, succulent grasses and willows, the former being indicative
of a year round flow of clear, cold spring water. (Tr.
291). The court so found in its Memorandum Decision.
(R. 50)
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The defendants jointly and severally assign the following errors up·on which they, and each of them, rely for
a reversal of the Decree and judgment 'appealed from
and for the judgment of this court directing the trial
court to make and enter judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs.
POINT ONE
That the trial court erred in deciding and disposing
of the case on the theory that the waters involved were
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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diffused, waste, seepage and percolating waters and as
such not subject to appropriation.

POINT TWO
That the trial court erred in denying defendants'
motion to reopen the case for the purpose of introducing
evidence showing that MeN a ugh ton Gulch is a natural
water course, that the waters flowing therein are in a
well-defined channel, flow constantly throughout the year,
and are public waters subject to appropriation, as they
were considered by both parties at the trial.

POINT THREE
The trial court erred in admitting in evidence over
defendants' objection the Deposition of J. P. Rudy.
(Tr. 225-6)

POINT FOUR
The trial co~rt erred in making numerous of its
Findings of Fact in the following particulars:

.a. The trial court erred in making ·that part of finding numbered 4 wherein it found: "that s·aid gulch in its
natural condition prior to· 1885 was dry and no water
flowed therein.'' That such finding is based upon the
testimony of one witness, John A. Gardner, (Tr. 8)
which testimony was not ~onfined to any particular point
on the gulch,· and which testimony was not material to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
any issue in the case for the .reason; that both parties
"~ere proceeding on the theory that McNaughton gulch
"\Yas a natural water cours~. (R. 67)
b. The trial court erred in making that part of
finding numbered 5 "\vherein it found: ''that through the
irrigation of these adjacent lands seepage and waste
"\Vaters find their "\Yay by percolation, seepage ·and surface run-off to the MeN a ughton Gulch.'' That there is
no evidence in the record of surface waste water running
into the gulch and that such finding is not supported
by the· evidence. ( R. 68)
c. The trial court erred in making that part of
finding numbered 5 wherein it found: "that the amount
of water thus finding its way into the McNaughton Gulch
varies from day to day and from season to season, depending upon the irrigation practices prevailing on these
adjacent lands; that the amount of· water available for
diversion from the gulch on to the McNaughton lands
is not measurable; that in 1885 the .amount of land surrounding the McNaughton Gulch which was, :being irrigated was not sufficient to produce any showing of
drainage water from that source, either surface or subterranean, in the MeNa ughton Gulch." That such finding
is contrary to the evidence and not supported thereby.
(R. 68)
d. The tial court erred in making that part of finding numbered 6 wherein it found: "~h'at the volume
of seepage or waste water flowing into the McNaughton
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
Gulch has increased with the increase irrigation within
its drainage area, but the flow at its lowest ebb is of a
negligible amount.'' That such finding is contrary to the
clear preponderance of the evidence. ( R. 68)
e. The trial court erred in making that part of finding numbered 6 wherein it found: ''and all of the water
thus finding its way into the McNaughton Gulch has its
origin originally in the Ashley Upper Canal.'' That
this finding is not supported by the evidence. (R. 69)
f. The trial court erred in making that p~art of finding No. 8 where it found that the plaintiffs' predecessors diverted water through one ditch running to the
South and another ditch running to the North of said
dam for the irrigation of the above described lands now
owned by the plaintiffs.'' That such finding is without
support in the evidence and is contrary to the clear .preponderance of the evidence. (R. 69)
g. The trial court erred in making that part of finding numbered 9 wherein it found: ''That prior to 1900
a network of ditches was constructed on the McNaughton
properties described above from the Carroll Dam and the
McNaughton Dam located near the Southeast corner of·
the West 40 acre tract, which dam has been mentioned
·above; that water could and can be diverted from the
McNaughton Gulch and could and can be applied to all
of the MeNa ugh ton lands described above, except approximately three acres in the Northwest corner of the
West 40 !acre tract, and approximately four acres located
South of the McNaughton Gulch on the West 40 acre
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tract and the "Taters from the gulch have been used on
said lands since the t":o dams referred to were first constructed.'' That such fiinding is contrary to the evidence.
(R. 70)
h. 'The trial court erred in making that part of finding nlunbered 11 wherein it found: "There is no evidence
that any of these conditions (cresses, grasses ~and willo"Ts) pertained prior to 1886 before canal water was
first applied in the drainage area, but the evidence is and
the court finds that the gulch was dry prior to said time.''
That there is no evidence to support this finding. (R. 70)
i. The trial court erred in making that part of finding numbered 12 wherein it found: "that all of said
dams used by the defendants to divert water from the
J\ticNaughton Gulch were constructed after the dam
maintained by the MeNaughtons near the Southeast
corner of the West 40 acre tract.'' That such finding
is without support in the evidence, and is contrary to the
clear preponderance thereof. ( R. 71)
POINT FIVE
The trial court erred in making its conclusions of
- law in the following particulars.
a. The trial court erred in its conclusions of law
contained in paragraph 1 thereof in so f~ar as it concludes:
''That none of the defendants have any rights in any
of the waters flowing in the McNaughton Gulch above
the dam maintained by the MeN a ugh tons near the .SouthSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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e'ast corner of the West 40 acre tract, and they and each
of them should be enjoined from attempting to divert
or use said water or from claiming any right or ownership thereto." That such conclusion of law is without
support in either the evidence or findings of fact; and
the same is contrary to law. (R. 71)
b. The trial court erred in its conclusions of law
contained in paragraph 2 thereof in so far as it concludes: ''That the water flowing into the MeNa ughton
Gulch above the last mentioned dam at the Southeast
corner of the West 40 acre tract is owned by the plaintiffs.'' · That such conclusions of law is without support
in either the evidence or the findings of fact, ~and the
same is contrary to law. ( R. 71).

POINT SIX
The trial court erred in making its decree in the
lowing particulars :

fol~

a. That the trial court erred in its Decree in the
third paragraph thereof insofar as its .decrees: ''That
the natural depression (the McNaughton Gulch) which
runs in a Southeasterly direction across the above described lands as is set forth fully in the Findings of
Fact, is by nature a dry wash; that the waters ~accumulat
ing therein, which are the subject matter of this dispute, have .their origin in . irrigated lands adjacent to
said wash, and .that said waters are seepage or waste
waters which find their .way through percolation into said
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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natural 'Yash or depression ""hich is commonly known ·as
the McNaughton Gulch." That such is without support
in the evidence. ( R. 72-73)
b. That the trial court erred in its .Decree in the
fourth paragraph thereof insofar as it decrees: "That
the plaintiffs are the owners of the right to use all of
the "\Vater accumulating in the McNaughton. Gulch. between the diversion dam located on property now owned
by Roy Carroll immediately West of the above described
MeNaught on property as described in the Findings of
Fact, and the McNaughton Dam which' is located immediately North of the Southeast corner of the vVest 40
acre tract described ·above, which said MeN a ugh ton Dam
is more fully described in the Findings of Fact, and also
to use the 'Yater from the Gulch on the MeNaughton
land located to the North of the MeN a ughton Gulch, and
that none of the defendants ha.ve any right to, use any
of the said water, and plaintiffs' title to said water is
hereby quieted, and the defendants and each of them
is hereby enjoined from using said water or attempting
to use the same, or from claiming any interest of any
kind therein." That such decree is without support in
either the evidence of the Findings of Fact and is contrary to law. (R. 73
c.

That the trial court erred in its Decree in the
fifth paragraph thereof wherein the court deereea:
"That the plaintiff, John E. MeN aughton, is the owner
of the right to use all the water thus accumulating in
the channel between the Roy Carrol Dam and· the MeSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Naughton Dam for the irrigation of the lands described
above, and are decreed to have the right to maintain a
tight diverting dam across the channel of the M-cNaughton Gulch at the point where the McNaughton Dam is
now maintained immediately North of the Southeast
corner of the West 40 acre tract described above, and
to divert and use all of said water from the McNaughton
Gulch at that or any other point on the M-cNaughton
property above the said McN'aughton Dam.'' That such
decree is without support in either the evidence of the
Findings of Fact and is contrary to law. (R. 73)
ARGUMENT
POINT ·ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING AND DISPOSING
OF THE CASE ON THE THEORY THAT THE WATERS IN
VOLVED WERE DIFFUSED, WASTE, SEEPAGE AND PERCOLATING WATERS AND AS SUCH NOT SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION.

While the written memorandum decision made by
the court below may not take the place of or serve to
modify or contradict the Findings of Fact, yet such opinion may he looked to to interpret and explain the Findings. Christensen v. Nelson, 73 Utah 603, 613; 276 Pac.
645. It will be seen from a reading of the court's memorandum opinion that the trial -court based its written memorandum opinion solely upon the assumption
that the waters involved in this controversy were diffused, percolating and seepage waters ~and as such not
subject to ·appropriation. It is also made to appear
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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that all of the parties to this proceeding directed their
evidence to the use that had been made of. the water
since before 1900. In making this statement we have not
overlook~d the fact that John A. Gardner testified to
the effect that in 1885 the McNaughton Gulch was dry.
(T. :24) nir. Gardner, ho,vever, does not state what time
of the year it "\Yas "\vhen he observed the gulch was dry,
what kind of a year it was as to precipitation or any
other fact that would enable one to determine whether
the condition of the gulch at the time it was observed
by ~Ir. Gardner was a temporary or a permanent condition. In its written opinion the court below recognized
the fact that it was deciding the case on a theory other
than that upon which the case was tried. In justification
for doing so the court cites the cases of· Gladhill et al v.
Malottf, 58 Utah 105, 197 Pac. 725 and Nelson et al v.
Sanpete County 40 Utah 5·60; 123 Pac. 334.
It is the established law that a party in an action
may not on appeal change the theory upon which a case
is tried in the trial court. Holman et al v. c·hristensen,
73 Utah 389; 274 Pac. 457. The rule precluding a party
from changing the theory of his case in the appellate
court is recognized by the cases cited by the court below.
Doubtless the principal basis for the rule is that if a
case is tried upon one theory and then upon a review by
the appellate court a different theory is urged, such
change in theory may well deprive a party to the action
of the opportunity of producing evidence of controlling
importance when viewed in the light of the theory adSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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vanced for the first time in the appellate court. If a
party to an action is deprived of an opportunity to produce evidence bearing upon the theory finally adopted
by the court in disposing of the action, it would make no
difference whether such deprivation was brought ahout
by a change of theory ·after trial, in the trial court or
the :appellate court.
Thus, this case was tried on the theory that the
water in controversy had been public waters subject to
appropriation and the evidence of all the parties was
directed to the -question of their respective priorities in
the use of such waters. There was no occasion to offer
any evidence touching the question of the w.ater in controversy being subject to appropriation during the course
of the trial because there was no issue or controversy
about that matter. The defendants were not called upon
during the course of the trial to offer such evidence as
they had in support of their claim that the water in dispute was such water as might be appropriated where as
here throughout the trial no one contented that such
waters were not or had not been subject to appropriation.
For the court to decide the case on a theory entirely different from that to which all the ,evidence was directed
deprived the defendants of a fair trial. Who ·can s~ay
that if the defendants had been advised that there was
some question -about the waters in dispute being subject
to appropriation, the defendants could not have established such fact beyond controversy.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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l\loreover, such evidence as was · received in this
case shows that the waters in dispute were public water~
subject to appropriation at the time the same. were. appropriated by the defendants. The evidence shows and
the trial court foun~ that the formation of the McNaughton Gulch "~as not within the memory of man, heading
at the top of a large drainage area, and .from its nature,
course and direction, it is logical to conclude that it was
caused only from storms and seasonal run-off of melting
snows. ( R. 48) The evidence is that the ·gulch is still
subjected to floods in times of torrential storms. (Tr. 76,
100) It may be inquired: "How else has any natural
"~ater- course ever been formed~'' In its memorandum
decision. the trial court from the evidence and testimony
accurately described the gulch as it crosses plaintiffs'
lands, varying from 3 to some 12 to 14 feet in depth
·and from 3 to 5 rods in width, with precipitous banks of
clay and sand which are constantly sluffing off, tending
to widen the Gulch. Lands on both sides of the gulch
slope towards it so that the natural drainage ·of considerable acreage is toward the gulch in addition to it
forming a collection area for sub-surface waters. (R.
49) The court also noted, as was also described by.various witness for both parti~s, that oall along the sides and
bottom of the gulch through plaintiffs' property, water
is seeping, oozing into the stream channel. That in several places definite springs exist and that grasses, water
cress, and willows grow all along the gulch. (R. 30)
How ·else can one more accurately describe the
history and existence of a natural water

form~tion,

course~
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16
unfortunate that there is no evidence as to the head,
end, length, type of water and other characteristics
which would be helpful in this determination, but this
absence can only be attributed to the theory upon which
the trial was had and the trial courts denial of defendants' motion for a new trial which was timely made
after learning that the court ha.d disregarded the trial
theory and made its decision upon the theory that the
waters of the gulch were not public waters.
There is no evidence to show that the volume of
water flowing in McNaughton Gulch has increased constantly with the increase of cultivation and irrigation
in that area. To the contrary, the evidence is that since
before 1900 the stream flow has been constant-the defendants testified without contradiction that since that time
they and their predecessors in interest have had sufficient water to irrigate their lands, and further that the
flow of the gulch has varied only with the flow of other
creeks and streams resulting from wet and dry seasons;
and that only in 1948 did they ever notice any decrease
in the flow of the gulch which aroused their suspicions.
An investigation disclosed the reason of the unprecedented variation of the flow was that plaintiff had diverted the water from the gulch. (Tr. 276, 293, 351, 352)
The record shows that McNaughton gulch was dry one
season but that was during the irrga.ting season and during a year when the entire area was dry and in need of
water. (Tr. 351) That the flow is constant throughout
the year indicates that the flow does not vary with the
application of irrigation water. (Tr. 61, 63, 322) It is
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a kno"rn fact that no one can accurately determine the
amount of the flow of ThieN a ugh ton gulch which could be
attributed to rain fall, snow, seepage, or percolation frorn
irrigation. In all instances the water would be diffused
" . .aters until it formed the flow of the gulch. There is
no evidence that surface waste water runs into the gulch
at any point.
If this were a controversy -over the waters percolating through the ground of the plaintiffs ibefore the same
emerged from the soil to join the flow of McNaughton
Gulch, then the trial court might consider such a question.
However, to bring these waters, after forming such a
constant flow in a channel of a water course as described
by the evidence presented by this case, under the defini·
tion of diffused and percolating waters in Wrathall v.
Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 Pac. (2d) 755, is something not
contemplated by the decision in that case. The definition
in that case cited by the trial court is as follows: "I use
the term (percolating waters) as diffused waters in lands
privately -owned, percolating or seeping through the
ground, moving by gravity in any or every direction
along a line of least resistance, not forming any part of
a stream or other hody of water either surface or s:Ubterranean, and, as far as known, not contributing or
tributary to a flow of any defined stream or body of
water. In other words, mere diffused waters in privately
owned lands, not flowing in any defined, or known stream,
either surface or subterranean, or not forming a part
of a body of water, either surface or subterranean."
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If the facts descr~bed by the evidence in this case
preclude the users of such waters from establishing a
right to the use of the same, many well-established
wat~r rights along .water courses similar to the McNaughton gulch :wjll be upset. There was introduced and
received in evidence in this case Civil No. 960, Uintah
County, Ma;ntle et al v. Eaton et al wherein the court
found that McNaughton gulch is a natural water course
and adjudicated t~e water among the defendants and
their predecessors in interest. That decree was received
in evidence · (T-r. 301). ,but the same is not marked as
an Exhibit.
The waters of nearly every creek or stream of the
State of Utah at one time have been diffused and percolating waters, but once they have emerged from the
ground and collected in the form a stream in a. natural
water course, they no longer can be s.aid to come under
the definition of percolating waters 'as used in the Wrathall case.
The question of what are and what are not percolating and surface waters has frequently been before the
courts. So far as we have been 1able to find there has not
been a Utah case where water naturally flowing in a well
defined natural channel has been held not subject to appropriation. It has :been uniformly held so far as we are
advised that water which finds its way into a natural
channel to augment the flow thereof becomes a part of
the stream. Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights,
Vol. 2, page 2164, Sec. 1194 and cases there cited.
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In Golobe v. Shute 22 Ariz 280, 196 Pac. 1024, the
court said '~ ,,~ e find no difficulty in holding that a ravine
or "·ash is a natural stream or watercourse, in the sense
of the law, ""'"here the rains or snows falling -on the adjacent hills run down the ravine or wash in a well-defined channel at irregular intervals.''
In Jaqu.ez Ditch Co. v. Garcia, 17 N.Mex. 160, 124
Pac. 891, the court held that an arroyo is not prevented
from being a natural water course merely because water
did not run in it during the entire year, and pointed out
that surface water originating from rains can form
watercourses under some circumstances, that the flow
need not be continuous, and classified the arroyo as a
watercourse.

The Supreme Court of Oregon dealt with the matter
in Simmons v. Winters, 21 Oregon 35, 27 Pac. 7, wherein
it held that a stream flow is a water course if it originates
from rain and melting snow descending through long,
deep depressions, upon lower lands, carves out a distinct channel which unmistakably bears the impress of
frequent waterflow, and has flowed from time immemorial.
In Wyoming, the Supreme court has dealt with this
problem in two cases. The first arose in 1935 in Wyoming
v. Hiber, 48 Wyo. 172, 44 Pac. 2d 1005, and was concerned
with a draw extending for only a short distance which
had no well defined banks or stream channel, but was
rather a typical grassy swale which could be crossed
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in a car at almost any point, was dry most of the time,
but drained rainfall from a small watershed of about
300 acres, bore no evidence of washing and did not present the casual appearance of a watercourse. The court
held that the waters were not those of a stream, but
were ordinary diffused surface waters which could be
used by the landowner without first appropriating them
under the State law. The second case was decided in
1940, B'inning v. Miller, 55 Wyo. 451, 102 Pac. 2d 54, in
which the same court held that a draw having no regular
stream channel and no banks, and having no great flow
of water except upon one ·occasion, was not a natural
stream subject to appropriation under such conditions
existing in 1906. Those ·conditions, however, were differentiated from the situation as of the year 1936, 30
years later, at which time the continued seepage from
surrounding lands had formed a regular, natural stream
at the lower end of the draw, the testimony showing that
at that point there were then definite channels and banks.
While the supreme court was not altogether satisfied on
the point, it was held that the water running in the
stream was, commencing at least with 1936, subject to
~appropriation, subject to the right of the owner of land
on which the seepage arose to make beneficial use of the
seepage water upon such land. Numerous other cases and
authorities will be found and discussed in the foregoing
cases from Wyoming.
In Hoefs v. Short, 114 Tex 501, 273 S.W. 785, 40
A.L.R. 833, the court held Barilla Creek to be a watercourse, adopting the princip·al that the existence of bed,
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banks, and pern1anent source of supply is merely evidentiary that a stream ean be used for irrigation or water
rig-ht purposes, and that once the fact of utility has
been conceded or established the stream is one to which
'Yater rights attach, regardless of variations from the
ideal stream of physiographers and meterologists. The
court adopted the view that the distinguishing characteristics of a stream is the fact that it will furntish the 'ad-.
vantages usually attendant upon a stream of water.
On the other hand, the waters have been generally
held to be diffused surface waters, where the drainage
area was so extremely small, or the flow so small or
such short duration, or the channel so short, that the
situation as a whole, esp~cially when compared with
acknowledged streams in the general area in which found,
negatived in the mind of the court its idea of what a
water course really is. Gibbs v. Williams 25 Kans. 214;
Walker v. New Mexico & S.P.R., 165 U.S. 593; Turner v.
Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W. 2d 221; Sangu·inetti v. Pock, 136 Calif. 46·6, 69 Pac. 98.
,)

It is to be noted from 'all these cases that there i'3.
a general lack of uniformity as to source of supply.
Some of the decisions speak of a permanent source while
others speak of a definite source. The latter is more accurate in the arid Western States. There is no difficulty
in calling a spring a definite source and the flow is generally either continuous or recurs with a measure of regularity, depending on the season. During dry seasons and
periods of drought any stream may diminish and in our
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own state it is not uncommon for them to· cease to flow
during one or more seasons or for the latter part of any
ir~iga ting season.
It is also evident from the cases that the tendency
has been, as it should be, to hold that a water course
exists, whatever may be the source of the water, where
a sizable stream was found to flow in a waterworn channel of considerable length for several months or even a
few weeks of each year, or that was otherwise characteristic of stream flow in the general area, and that was
susceptible of substantially valuable and bene~cial use.
In the light of the foregoing cases certainly the
waters of MeN a ugh ton Gulch should not be classified
as diffuse_d, seepage and percolating waters. This water
is concentrated in a waterworn channel, the banks of
which are well defined and have been from time immemorial. The evidence is uncontradicted that somewhere near 1900 the predecessors in interest of the defendants raced to see who could first make an appropriation from McNaughton Gulch, (Tr. 11, 12) .and that ever
since the first appropriation all the defendants and their
pr,edecessors in interest have had and have used sufficient water to irrigate their lands. (Tr. 66, 67, 125, 316,
108).
It should be noted that the plaintiff admitted that
the water stock they now own in the Ashley Upper Canal
Co. and the Ashley Reservoir Company, which represent a full water right for his acreage under the practice
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of the community, was obtained by the. beneficial use of
such waters upon the very land he now claims to have
used the 'vaters of McNaughton Gulch. (Tr. 210, 211,
212, 213) Plaintiff also testified that of recent years he
has leased his canal ·and reservoir water. (Tr. 154)
The facts of the case now before the court remove
it from the scope and intent of Garns v. Robbins, 41 Utah
260, 125 Pac. 867, Ann. Cas. 1915 C 1159 and ~oberts
v. Gribble, 43 Utah 411, 134 Pac. 1014. Those ·cases held
that percolating water resulting from irrigation of one's
own land may be recovered and used by the owner before it leaves his land. There is no evidence in this case
that the source of the water in controversy is from the
application of water to plaintiffs' land. Neither is this a
controversy over the relative rights of adjoining landowners to construct drains or otherwise recapture diffused, seepage, percolating waters. This is a controversy over waters which have naturally found their
way into McNaughton Gulch from over a large drainage
area and have formed a constant, considerable flow.
Under the rule of Rasmussen v. Moroni lrrig.ation
Co., 56 Utah 140, 189 Pac. 572, and Richlands Irrigation
Co. v. Westview Irrigation ·Co., 96 Utah 403, 80 Pac.
(2d) 458, the plaintiffs should not interfere with the
seepage and diffused waters which would otherwise
reach the stream. And certainly such plaintiffs cannot appropriate the stream itself. The instant case is
not concerned with a recapture of waste and seep·age
waters. The plaintiff is not contending that he has
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made such a recapture. This controversy is over waters
that have by natural means found their way into a
water course and merged into a stream.
In the case of Smithfield 'West Bench Irrigation
Co. v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. et al, 113 Utah 356,
195 Pac. (2d) 249, decided in 1948, this court stated,
"It is well established * * * * that waters diverted
from a natural source, applied to irrigation and recaptured before they escape from the original appropriator's control, still belong to the original appropriator."
However, in this case, the plaintiffs are not seeking
to recapture water appropriated by them, but are
seeking to control waters flowing from springs which
have formed into a definite stream. The court further
states in the Smithfield case that even if an original
appropriator recaptures his water he may again reuse
them only if he has a beneficial use for such waters.
It is the defendants' contention that McNaughton
Gulch is and always has been a natural water course
and the waters thereof public waters subject to appropriation. However, if this court should find the waters
of said gulch to be waste, seepage, diffused and percolating waters the -defendants should still be awarded
the waters under the doctrine of reasonable and beneficial use.
The case of Riordan v. W estw·ood, Utah, 203 Pac.
(2d) 922, decided in 1949 and numerous other cases as
well as U.C.A., 1943, 100-1-3 fixes "beneficial use" as
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the measure and limit of all rights to the use of water
in this state. The adjudicated cases show the courts
of this state have uniformly attempted to give effect
to the statute regardless of the source of the water
and to require the beneficial use of all waters in this
arid region. The trend of the courts as well as the
Legislature is to,vard an enlargement of waters which
are subject to appropriation.

POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT. ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT
DEFENDANTS TO REOPEN THE CASE OR GRANT A
NEW TRIAL.

Under Point one heretofore discussed, we have
briefly referred to the refusal of the court below to
permit the defendants to reopen the case or grant a
new trial. In addition to what is there said, it may
further be observed that a party to an action may be
as effectively deprived of a fair trial by a trial court
deciding a case on a different theory than that upon
which it was tried ~as if an appellate court should do
the same thing. The difference is that if a trial court
commits such error there is available to the aggrieved
party a motion to reopen the case or for a new trial
and thus p·ermit the reception of addition evidence
touching any material matters that were not investigated when the case was tried because the parties
proceeded on the assumption that there was no controversy about such matters. Certain it is that when
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a case is tried on one t~eory and. decided .on an
entirely different theory 'Yhich requires different evidence the injustice that may flow from ~.uch practice
is the same whether followed i~ a trial court or in ~n
appellate court in the ·~bsence of the aggrieved party
being given an opportunity to. be heard on the theory
upon which the case is. decided. The trial court has
at its disposal the means of affording the party who
deems himself prejudiced by a change of theory by the
court after the evidence is in of either leave to reopen
the case or grant a new trial and thereby afford the
parties· an opportunity to 'be· fully heard upon the
theory which the court deems the proper 'th.eqry. The
functions of reopening a case or the granting of a
new trial is to correct just such a. miscarriage of justice.
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE THE TESTIMONY OF J. P. RUDY

The testimony of J. P. Rudy _was taken on August
17, 1948 apparently pursuant to Chapter 52 .of Title
104, U.C.A., 1943. Amo:n,g other matters it is there
provided- ''The Judge must also designate in his
order the clerk of the court to whom the deposition
must be returned when taken". It will be noted that the
order of the court in this case ·contains no such provision.
It will also he observed that the order permitting
the taking of the deposition of J. P. Rudy requires
that the notice of the hearing be given ten days before
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such hearing. There is no competent evidence as to
when or \Yhere service of the notice of the taking of
the testimony of J. P. Rudy was served upon the defendants. It is also made to appear that the so-called
notice and deposition were at the time of the trial
taken from the files in a criminal case. ( Trs. 225-6)
The deposition of Mr. Rudy and the proceedings had
in connection with the taking of the same is enclosed
in ~an envelope attached to the Judgment Roll.
POINT FOUR
THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF
FACT IN A NUMBER OF PARTICULARS.

Because the court decided the case on •a theory
other than that upon which it was tried, the evidence
is very meager as to some of the questions which the
court below apparently deemed of controlling impor-.
tance. Thus the court found it is finding numbered
four that said gulch (McNaughton Gulch) in its natural
condition prior to 1885 was dry and no w·ater flowed
therein." (R. 67) The only evidence we can find in
the record in support of the finding just quoted is that
of John A. Gardner. He testified that the McNaughton
Gulch ''was a dry gulch'' in 1885. (Tr. 4) Mr. Gardner
further testified that a dam was placed in the gulch
in about 1886 on the Carroll property which is 'a mile
or maybe not more than a half mile west of the
Carroll property. (Tr. 5) The fact that a dam was
constructed in the gulch in 1886 would 'Seem to be
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conclusive pToof that there was water in ·the gulch
during that year. Indeed, .the fact that there was a
gulch with high banks and a bed, as the evidence without ·conflict shows, is most convincing that at some
time in the past there was water therein. The very
existence of the Gulch could not well have been brought
about by any other means than a stream of water.
Numerous witnesses testified that dams were placed
in the MeN a ugh ton Gulch prior to 1900 and that the
defendants, except during dry years, were well supplied with water from that source for the irrigation
of their lands. Among Such witnesses •are : W. Simpson
Ross (Tr. 316); Ed Tyzack testified that his Father,
along in about 1900, got water to irrigate his farm
from the McNaughton Gulch, that he got fish and
muskrats from the gulch, and went in swimming above
a dam in the gulch. (Tr. 18, 22) As we understand,
fish require water to live in and mu skrats do not live
in dry gulches. Asher Merkley testified that wat.er
runs in the McNaughton Gulch most of the irrigation
season, and that he had never seen it dry (Tr. 61)
There is other evidence to the same effect but as we
understand, no claim i1s or could be made that there
has not been water flowing in the Gulch since 1886.
Not being so no useful purpose will be served by directing the attention of the Court to such other evidence
touching the fact that the Gulch was not dry :after 1885.
1

1

There is no direct evidence to support that part
of findings numbered 5 wherein it is found that seepage and warste waters found their way :by percolation,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29

seepage and surface run off into the MeN aughton Gulch.
The most that can be said in support of such finding
is that when the adjacent lands were irrigated p-robably
some of such "\Vater found its way into the Gulch.
Even if that is so it by no mean's follows ~hat the
waters of the gulch were not subject to appropri~ation.
As we have heretofore in this brief pointed out the
authorities are, so far as we are able to ascertain,
uniform to the effect that waters which find their
way into a natural water course become a part of the
stream and the appropriators of the waters of such
stream are entitled to the use of the water so augmenting the stream the same as the other waters thereof.
The court will also look in vain to find any direct
evidence to support the finding to the effect that the
amount of water that finds its way into the McNaughton
Gulch varies from day to day and from season to season depending upon the irrigation practices prevailing
on the adjacent lands. Such finding is based solely
upon an inference and is at variance with the direct
testimony of such witnesses as Asher Merkley (Tr. 61
to 67), Edward Hoeft (Tr. 100 to 106) Ernest Johnson (Tr. 126) and W. Simpson Ross (Tr. 322).
The foregoing evidence also refutes that part of
finding No. 6 wherein the court found that the volume
of seepage or waste water flowing into the McNaughton
Gulch h~a:s increased with the increased irrigation within its drainage area, but the flow at its lowest ebb is
of a negligible amount.
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So ~lso is there an absence of evidence to support
that part of finding nu~bered .. '6 wherein.. it is found
that the water thus finding its way into the McNaughton
Gulch has .its origin ori~nally in the .AJ~hley upper
canal. The fact is and the evidence . sho:ws that th~
Gulch was in existence from a .time whereof the
memory of man runneth not to the contra~y and the
Ashley Canal is of recent origil_l.
In their assignment of errors attacking the trial
court findings, the· defendants have subdivided. such
assignment. We do not fi~d any evidence. whatsoeve-r
which supports a number of the' findings so attacked
and therefore nothing more can be said as to' such
assignments, that is to say, if there is no evidence
to support a finding, not~ing mor~ can be said as to
why the tri~al .court erred in making the finding . so
attacked.
"
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Moreover, in the light of the tr:lal courts ·conclu·~ion that the waters in controversy were not subject 'to
appropriation, .no useful pu~pose can :be :served by the
findings of fact other th~n or in addition to the findings
of such facts . as are necessary to establish the. conclusion that the water is not :subject to appropriation.
In other words if the defendants or their predecessors
in interest have not· acquired a right to the waters:
of McNaughton Gulch they can not be heard to complain
because the plaintiff has impounded the same and
deprived the defendants of the u~se thereof.
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POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

It will be noted that in its Conclusions of Law the
court below awarded to the plaintiffs not only the water
which finds its way into the McNaughton Gulch on
plaintiffs' land, but also all water that finds its way
into the McNaughton Gulch above plaintiffs' l·and. Not
only that, but the court concludes that the ·defendants
should be enjoined from attempting to divert any
waters that find their way into the McNaughton Gulch
above plaintiffs' land. Thus, if any of the defendants·
own or should acquire a tract of land above plaintiffs'
land through which the McNaughton Gulch extends
they should, according to the conclusions of law of the
trial court, be enjoined from using the same. Obviously
if the defendants by the use made by them of the
waters of McNaughton Gulch cannot acquire any right
to any waters that ~arise on plaintiffs' land, by the
same token the plaintiffs' may not by use acquire any
right to the use of water that arises on lands not
owned by them.
POINT SIX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING
ITS DECREE.

The trial court also by its decree awarded to the
pl·aintiffs not only the water which fin~ds its way into
the McNaughton Gulch on plaintiffs' land, but also to
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all water which finds its way into the McNaughton
Gulch at or above the Carroll property. Here again
by its decree the court refuses to award water which
throughout the years has, under claim of right, been
beneficially used by the defendants on their lands
because, as the court finds, the same arises on plaintiffs' lands and at the same time awards to the pl~ain
tiffs, without competent proof of beneficial use, water
which has a similar source of supply on lands owned
by persons other than the plaintiffs. If the plaintiffs
may acquire by mere use a right to water finding its
way into the MeN augh ton Gulch on lands not owned by
them, we can conceive of no reason why the same
right should not be accorded the defendants.

c·o N C L U SI·O N
It is the contention of the Defendants that the
trial court committed the following fundamental errors
in the trial and disposition of this ease. Such errors
being:
1.

That the defendants were denied a fair trial

because the court below decided and disposed of the
case on the theory that the waters involved were diffused, waste, seepage and percolating waters while all
of the

p~arties

tried the case on the theory that the
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waters involved have been public waters and as such
subject to appropriation and the same have been appropriated by the defendants.
2. That the evidence shows that the water~s in
dispute were public waters, subject to appropri~ation
and the same have been lawfully appropriated by the
defendants.
3. That if it should be held that the evidence
fails to show that the waters in dispute were subject
to appropriation, the court erred in refusing the request
of the defendants to reopen the case or to gr,ant a
new trial to the dependants and thereby afford the
defendants an opportunity to offer further proof that
the waters in dispute were such waters as might lawfully be appropriated.
4. That if the waters 1n controversy are such
waters as are subject to appropriation neither the evidence, the findings of fact, nor the conclusions of law
are sufficient to sustain the decree awarding the water
here involved to the plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that the water in
dispute or the major part thereof be awarded to the
defendants or if that may not be done that the cause
be remanded to the court below with the direction to
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such court to. grant a new trial or P~!mit the reopening
of the case for the reception of such fu;rther evidence
as the parties may ~desire to offer.
R.es.pectfully submitted,
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